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During the fall of 2004, while most of the nation’s political attention was riveted on the 
presidential election, two intriguing and potentially significant political developments were occurring 
at the municipal level. In San Francisco on Election Day, voters participating in the election for the 
city’s Board of Supervisors cast their ballots using an unusual (for Americans) system of instant run-
off voting (IRV), which enabled them to indicate their second and third choices in addition to their 
first preference. If no candidate in a district receives an outright majority of the first-place votes cast, 
the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and the votes for that candidate are reallocated to 
those voters’ second choices. If that still fails to produce a majority winner, the process is repeated. 
This enables voters to vote for independent or third party candidates without the fear that they are 
“wasting” their votes or supporting a “spoiler,” and avoids the cost of a runoff election. 
A few weeks later across the country, the members of the New York City Council took a 
dramatic step when they overrode Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s veto and significantly expanded the 
reach of the City’s already noteworthy1 campaign finance law. The old law, which was first enacted in 
1988, created a voluntary campaign financing program under which participating candidates for local 
office are eligible for public matching funds if they agree to spending limitations and to abide by the 
City’s disclosure requirements and contribution limitations – restrictions much tighter than New York 
state’s very loose limits on donations to local candidates.2 The amendments adopted at the end of 2004 
                                                 
1 See PAUL RYAN, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUD., A STATUTE OF LIBERTY: HOW NEW YORK CITY’S CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING THE FACE OF LOCAL ELECTIONS 15 (2003), http://www.cgs.org/publications/docs/ 
nycreport.pdf (referring to the New York City law as a “model for the nation”). 
2 See id. at 8–13. 
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extend New York City’s disclosure requirements and contribution limitations to all candidates for 
municipal office – even those not participating in the public funding program.3 The amendments also 
address a problem endemic to public campaign financing programs: self-financing candidates who 
spend well above the voluntary spending limits. Reacting to Bloomberg’s expenditure of $73 million 
of his personal funds in his successful quest for the mayoralty in 2001, the City Council voted not only 
to lift the spending limit for a participating candidate facing a self-funded opponent but also to provide 
the participating candidate with an unprecedented six-to-one public funds match for qualifying private 
contributions.4  
These developments in San Francisco and New York are illustrative of a broader phenomenon 
– political innovation and reform at the local level. Although the scope of local autonomy remains 
subject to continued academic debate, a number of cities and counties across the country have been 
actively engaged in examining and revising their local governmental and electoral processes, and in 
experimenting with new forms of political organization. Many of these – like alternative voting 
systems,5 campaign finance reform,6 term limits,7 and conflict of interest regulation8 – can involve 
                                                 
3 See N.Y. CITY COUNCIL LOCAL LAW 59–60 (2004), available at http://www.nyccouncil.info. 
4 See N.Y. CITY COUNCIL LOCAL LAW 58, §6, (2004) (amending Section 3-706(3) of the Administrative Code of the 
City of New York), available at http://www.nyccouncil.info. The six-to-one match is capped at $1500 in public funds 
per contributor, and the total public funds payment capped at 125% of the expenditure limit for the office the candidate 
is seeking. 
5 See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, FINAL REPORT, ENHANCING ACCESS, OPPORTUNITY AND 
COMPETITION: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM (2003), http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/downloads/pdf/final_report2003. 
pdf (proposing that New York City replace its partisan electoral system with a two-step nonpartisan system). The 
Charter Revision Commission’s proposal was rejected by New York City voters in the November 2003 election.  
6 See generally, NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, LOCAL CAMPAIGN FIN. REFORM (2002), http://www.ncl.org/npp/lcfr/ 
inventory.html (listing cities and counties that have adopted a range of campaign finance reform measures, including 
contribution limits, expenditure limits, public financing, disclosure, time limits on fundraising, and prohibitions on 
contributions from certain donors, like government contractors). See also Paul Ryan, Beyond BCRA: Cutting-Edge 




fairly dramatic changes in local politics and governance. Other local initiatives, such as revisions of 
tax,9 budget,10 or legislative procedures,11 or the size of the local legislative body,12 seem more 
prosaic, although they, too, can affect the substance of local decisions. But large or small, these 
developments nicely illustrate both the capacity of local governments to restructure basic features of 
their political organization, and their interest in doing so.  
These developments test the legal as well as the political meaning of home rule.  When these 
measures are adopted without express state authorization, courts may be called upon to decide whether 
they fall within the scope for local self-government created by state home rule constitutional 
provisions or statutes. Moreover, because, typically, state laws address many aspects of local 
government structure and local elections, local political innovations are often subject to the claim that 
                                                                                                                                                                
7 See, e.g., Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding city charter’s 
two-term limit provision for mayor and council members); Roth v. Cuevas, 624 N.E.2d 689 (N.Y. 1993) (upholding 
New York City charter amendment imposing term limits on municipal elected officials). But cf. Cottrell v. Santillanes, 
901 P.2d 785 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that locally adopted term limits for municipal officials were preempted by 
state constitution). 
8 See, e.g., Golden v. Clark, 564 N.E.2d 611 (N.Y. 1990) (prohibiting party officials from holding certain municipal 
elected positions); Suffolk County Ethics Comm’n. v. Neppell, 762 N.Y.S. 2d 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (ruling that 
county ethics code is not preempted by state financial disclosure requirements). See also NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, LOCAL 
CAMPAIGN FIN. REFORM: CASE STUDIES, INNOVATIVE, AND MODEL LEGIS. (2001), http://www.ncl.org/npp/lcfr/lcfr_ 
addendum.pdf (discussing provision of Westminster Colorado city charter precluding city councilor from debating or 
voting on any issues that directly affect any person who contributed more than $100 to the councilor’s campaign). 
9 See, e.g., Traders Sports, Inc. v. City of San Leandro, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding city 
charter provision enabling council to vote by simple majority to put a tax increase on the ballot, rather than the two-
thirds council vote required by state law). 
10 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Town & Borough of Naugatuck, 843 A.2d 603 (Conn. 2004) (upholding power of town to 
provide for separate referenda on education and general town budgets, notwithstanding state law providing for single 
referendum on combined education and general town budget). 
11 See, e.g., Windham Taxpayers Ass’n v. Windham, 662 A.2d 1281 (Conn. 1995) (allowing town charter, not state 
law, to determine criteria for submitting legislation to a town meeting). 
12 See, e.g., State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 845 P.2d 150 (N.M. 1992) (upholding authority of home rule municipality 
to create a commission larger than provided by state law). 
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they are preempted by inconsistent state laws or state occupation of the field. Although decisions vary, 
reflecting differences in both state home rule enactments and state home rule judicial doctrines, local 
political innovations have done surprisingly well in state courts.   
This paper examines local political innovations, their reception in state courts, and the 
implications for home rule and for political reform more broadly defined. Part II will review some 
recent local political innovations, with particular attention to instant runoff voting and campaign 
finance reform.  
Part III will analyze the fate of local political innovations in state courts. In most cases, the 
critical legal issue has been not home rule authority per se but preemption. To a considerable degree, 
state courts have upheld these local innovations either by determining that the local interest in local 
elections or the structure of local government outweighs the state interest behind the conflicting state 
statute or by concluding that the state did not mean to preclude local departures from state-prescribed 
models.   
Part IV will consider some of the implications of these political innovation/preemption 
decisions for home rule more broadly. The political innovation/preemption cases suggest techniques 
that may be used to expand local autonomy within the general legal framework of state predominance 
in state-local relations. This could be particularly relevant for other aspects of local governance, such 
the municipal employment relationship or local taxation.  
Finally, in Part V, I will conclude with a brief discussion of the external benefits of local 
political reform. Although the judicial analysis of local innovations in elections or political procedures 
focuses on the predominant local interest in these matters, there is a significant general public interest 
in the local freedom to innovate. San Francisco’s IRV system, New York City’s campaign finance 
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reforms, and other local political developments have drawn national attention, as they involve basic 
questions of political participation and governance that are significant throughout the country. Seventy 
years ago, Justice Brandeis celebrated the role of the states as laboratories of democracy. These local 
initiatives suggest that a significant benefit of home rule can be the local introduction and testing of 
political innovations that can have national consequences. 
 
II. Local Political Innovation 
As a preliminary matter, in referring to a local political innovation or electoral reform, I do not 
mean to praise the development or suggest it constitutes an improvement over the prior political or 
electoral structure. All I mean is that the measure is a change, often a significant one, adopted at the 
local level with the intention of affecting local politics or governance. Moreover, this brief survey is 
neither comprehensive nor the result of a systematic review of the history or current scope of local 
political innovation. Rather, by chronicling a handful of past and present instances of local political 
reform, I hope to give some sense of the capacity and willingness of local governments to experiment 
with local government organization and the design of the local political process 
A. Background: The Form of Local Government and Local Voting Systems 
Local governments have long been involved in political innovation and electoral reform. Two 
of the three principal forms of municipal organization – the city commission plan, and the council-
manager system – were products of local innovation. The commission plan was developed by citizens 
in Galveston, Texas when the old mayor-council government proved unequal to the task of responding 
to the destruction resulting from a hurricane and tidal wave in September 1900. Although formal 
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creation of the commission required state legislative action, the impetus was local.13 So, too, the 
spread of the commission form, first to other cities in Texas and then throughout the country, was 
attributable to local demands, confirmed by local charter adoptions.14 In 1907, Des Moines, Iowa 
“tempered the antidemocratic and centralizing features of the Texas idea by incorporating such 
techniques of direct democracy as initiative, referendum, and recall”15 and a nonpartisan primary16 into 
the commission system. As with the commission plan in Texas, the lack of home rule in Iowa meant 
that adoption of the manager system required state legislative authorization. But the enabling law “had 
originally been brought forward and urged,” by the citizens of Des Moines and the adoption of the 
plan was contingent on voter approval.17 
Shortly after that, Dayton, Ohio – acting, like Galveston, in the aftermath of a flood – became 
the first large city to adopt the council-manager form of city government.18 Moreover, in Dayton, the 
innovation reflected the city’s local legal autonomy. “The real starting point [for the city manager 
system] was the adoption of a home-rule amendment to the Ohio constitution in the year preceding. 
This made possible what many of the citizens had long desired – a scheme of local government 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., WILLIAM B. MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICA’S CITIES 295–97 (1921). 
14 See id. at 298–302; MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY: MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM 
IN AMERICA: 1880-1920 136-39 (1977).   
15 See RAYMOND A. MOHL, THE NEW CITY: URBAN AMERICA IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE, 1860-1920 119 (1985). 
16 See MUNRO, supra note 13, at 300. Local governments have played a leading role in the development and spread of 
nonpartisan elections in the United States. See Carol A. Cassel, The Nonpartisan Ballot in the U.S., in ELECTORAL 
LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 226–41 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart, eds., 1986) [hereinafter 
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES]. 
17 MUNRO, supra, note 13, at 298. 
18 Id. at 388. Several smaller cities, including Staunton, Virginia, Lockport, New York, and Sumter, South Carolina, 
had previously adopted city manager systems. Id. at n.1. 
 
 7 
adapted to local needs.”19 In the years that followed, the “Dayton plan” spread rapidly to many small 
and medium-sized cities.20 
Local governments have also taken the lead in experimenting with so-called alternative voting 
systems – which are alternatives to the dominant form of winner-take-all, single-member-district, first-
past-the-post-elections used to elect all federal and nearly all state and local legislators in the United 
States.21 Alternative voting systems provide representation for city-wide or district-level minorities 
unable to win seats in winner-take-all elections. 
In the early and middle decades of the twentieth century, some two dozen cities, including New 
York City, Cleveland, and Cincinnati, experimented with a variety of proportional representation 
(“PR”) systems that sought to enable a wider range of interests to obtain seats in municipal legislative 
bodies.22 The adoption of proportional representation “came about as part of municipal reform 
movements in the cities concerned,”23 was frequently connected to other municipal reforms (like the 
                                                 
19 Id. at 388-89. See also, SCHIESL, supra note 14, at 175 (noting that the Dayton charter providing for a council-
manager government followed directly on Ohio’s adoption of a home rule constitutional amendment). 
20 See MOHL, supra note 15, at 120. See also Bareham v. City of Rochester, 158 N.E. 51 (N.Y. 1927) (upholding 
Rochester’s authority to depart from the state-prescribed municipal structure of a strong mayor and partisan elections 
and replace it with a council-manager government with nonpartisan elections). 
21 They are also in contrast with the city-wide, winner-take-all at-large elections characteristic of many local 
governments.  
22 See Leon Weaver, The Rise, Decline and Resurrection of Proportional Representation in Local Governments in the 
U.S., in POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 16, at 139–53. As Judge Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals 
explained in the case upholding the 1936 New York City Charter amendment providing for the election of city 
council members by proportional representation, PR “is intended . . . to give to minority groups a share in government 
which must be denied them if we adhere to the principle that all officers of government must be elected by a plurality 
of the voters of the voting district.” Johnson v. City of New York, 9 N.E.2d 30, 39 (N.Y. 1937). Under PR, New York 
voters in 1945 elected two Communists (in addition to fourteen Democrats, three Republicans, two Liberals and two 
members of the American Labor Party) to the New York City Council, which precipitated a move to repeal PR. In 
1947, the electorate, which had approved a Charter amendment adding PR in 1936, approved a Charter amendment 
abolishing PR, effective 1949. 
23 Weaver, supra note 22, at 140. 
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council-manager system or nonpartisan elections),24 and was effectuated by local referenda rather than 
state authorization or imposition.25 Nearly all these local PR systems were also subsequently repealed, 
again typically by local referendum.26  
Local governments have also played an important role in experimenting with so-called semi-
proportional electoral systems which rely on districts rather than an-large elections, and provide for 
the election of multiple representatives from the same district, but bolster the position of electoral 
minorities. These systems maintain the neighborhood representation than can be lost in proportional 
representation while providing some of the minority representation that results from PR elections.  
Under limited voting, for example, an individual voter can cast fewer votes than the number of seats to 
be filled from the voter’s district. This assures that a minority can win at least one seat from the 
district. Virtually all the experience with limited voting in the United States is at the local level. A 
large number of city councils in Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania have used this system. New 
York City adopted this system for the election of borough-wide representatives to its city council in 
1961,27 and used it for two decades. The intent and effect was to facilitate the election of some non-
Democrat council members in the Democratic Party-dominated city.  
B. Instant Runoff Voting  
San Francisco’s adoption of instant runoff voting should be seen against this backdrop of 
                                                 
24 Id. at 142. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 140–42. 
27 See Blaikie v. Power, 193 N.E.2d 55 (N.Y. 1963). The New York City plan provided each borough with an equal 
number of borough-wide representatives. Ultimately, that voting arrangement was found to violate the one person, 
one vote requirement. Andrews v. Koch, 528 F. Supp. 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d 688 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1982), aff’d 
mem. sub nom. Giacobbe v. Andrews, 459 U.S. 801 (1982). 
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longstanding municipal experimentation with alternative voting systems. To be sure, unlike 
proportional representation or limited voting, IRV does not directly limit the power of local majorities 
or increase the ability of political minorities to elect representatives to the local legislature. However, 
IRV can strengthen the position of minor parties and independents in the polity by enabling voters to 
cast ballots for third parties and outsider candidates without the fear that their votes will be “wasted” 
on a candidate who has no chance of winning, or, worse, that by voting for a long-shot they are 
making it more likely that the candidate they least prefer among the major contenders is more likely to 
win. By enabling voters to list and rank multiple candidates, IRV permits a voter to vote for both her 
sincere first choice and, if different, for her preference among the major contenders.  If a voter casts a 
first-place ballot for a third-party candidate then either (i) one of the major contenders will win an 
outright majority – in which case the voter did not somehow help swing the election to someone she 
opposes – or, (ii) if no one of the major contenders wins an outright majority, her vote can also be 
counted in deciding which of the major candidates prevails.  
IRV can lead to more voting for minor parties and independents – although only to the extent 
that those candidates actually enjoy voter support – while also assuring that the ultimate winner is 
backed by a majority of voters. IRV can reveal the true extent of electoral support for minor parties, 
such as the Green Party or the Libertarian Party, which would be lost if Green supporters or 
Libertarians chose to vote for one of the major contenders out of the strategic fear that their preferred 
candidate will be no more than a spoiler. An IRV election, thus, gives a better sense of the diversity of 
electoral opinion within the community and of the extent of support for minority political positions.28 
                                                 
28 See Votes Would Carry More Weight with Instant Runoff, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 21, 2004 (arguing that “the 
sophisticated system more accurately reflects voter sentiment”). 
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Moreover, IRV can promote more positive campaigning and less divisive politics. Candidates have an 
incentive not just to turn out their base but also to take positions that gain them the second- or third-
place support of the voters who also back their opponents. Indeed, one news account of the San 
Francisco IRV election found that the new electoral mechanism “has made campaigning more 
civilized,” with candidates not only appealing for second- and third-choice votes, but opponents also 
appearing at each other’s fundraisers, sharing Web sites and making cross-endorsements.29 This can 
also sustain minor parties – or at least advance some of their policy goals – even if the minor parties 
are unable to win a seat.  
San Francisco became the first American community in three decades30 to adopt IRV, when in 
2002 the city’s voters approved the voting system for city elections. The system was first implemented 
in the November 2004 elections for the city’s Board of Supervisors, and used again in 2005 in 
elections for the city-wide offices of assessor-recorder and city treasurer.31  
It is too soon to assess the significance of IRV in San Francisco. The early signs, however, are 
positive.  A survey of the 2004 election undertaken by political scientists at San Francisco State 
University found that most voters felt they understood IRV, preferred it to the old system, and 
                                                 
29 Kimberly Edds, For Voters, Choice is as Easy as 1, 2, 3, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A3; See also Dean E. 
Murphy, New Runoff System in San Francisco Has the Rival Candidates Cooperating, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, 
at A16. 
30 Ann Arbor, Michigan adopted IRV by charter amendment in 1974.  Ann Arbor, Michigan Charter Amendment 
(proposed Nov. 5, 1974), http://www.fairvote.org/?page=385. After using IRV for the April 1975 mayoral election, 
Ann Arbor voters repealed IRV in April 1976. See FAIRVOTE, FEBRUARY E-NEWS, http://www.fairvote.org (follow 
“Newsletter” hyperlink; then follow “Mar. 2nd 2005” hyperlink). 




exercised the opportunity to vote for second and third choice candidates.32 It is less clear whether IRV 
will change the types of candidates who are elected to office. Of the seven supervisor seats up for 
election, candidates won outright majorities in three, and the first-place candidates were elected after 
the redistribution of second-choice votes in the other four. One Green was elected to the Board of 
Supervisors, but he replaced a Green who had been previously elected to that seat. In the two 2005 
races, one candidate won with an outright majority in one race, while in the other race the first-place 
candidate was not elected until after the redistribution of second-choice votes.33 In both years, IRV 
saved the city the cost of mounting run-off elections.34 
San Francisco’s adoption of IRV received considerable national attention and seems to have 
sparked a new interest in electoral reform in other communities. Earlier in 2004, Berkeley, California 
adopted IRV,35 and voters in Ferndale, Michigan approved IRV for future mayor and city council 
                                                 
32 FRANCIS NEELY, LISEL BLASH & COREY COOK, AN ASSESSMENT OF RANKED-CHOICE VOTING IN THE SAN 
FRANCISCO 2004 ELECTION, FINAL REPORT 2–3 (2005), http://pri.sfsu.edu (follow “Reports” hyperlink). 
 
33 See Matthew S. Bajko, Cisneros, Ting Win First Elections, BAY AREA REP., Nov. 10, 2005, available at 
http://fairvote.org/ (follow “In the News” hyperlink; then follow “Cisneros, Ting Win First Elections” hyperlink). 
 
34  Although public reaction to IRV was generally positive, see Rachel Gordon & Ilene Lelchuk, 
It’s a Go; Premiere of Ranked-Choice Voting Method Mostly Gets a Thumbs-Up, S.F. CHRON., 
Nov. 3, 2004, at B1, the first IRV election was marred by a software glitch, attributed to 
unexpectedly high turnout, that delayed the tallying of redistributed second place votes. See 
Suzanne Herel, Election Aftermath: Turnout Swamped ‘Ranked’ Software, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 
2004, at B1, Lee Romney, San Francisco Officials Repair Voting Glitches: High Turnout Slowed 
the Tallying of ‘Ranked Choice’ Selections in a Supervisor’s Contest, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at 
B6.  
35 See THE CENTER FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, Instant Runoff in Berkeley, (Mar. 13, 2004), 
http://www.fairvote.org/irv/berkeley.htm (reporting that Berkeley voters adopted IRV by a margin of 72% to 28% in 
the March 2004 election). 
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elections at a referendum held on Election Day 2004.36  In March 2005, voters in Burlington,  
Vermont’s largest city, voted to amend their charter to use IRV in mayoral elections37, and in 
November 2005, the voters in Takoma Park, Maryland voted to implement IRV in municipal elections 
starting in 2007.38 There may soon be enough municipalities using IRV in local elections to provide a 
better understanding of how this electoral system can affect electoral outcomes and local governance. 
C. Campaign Finance Reform 
Local campaign finance reform legislation has less of a historic pedigree than experimentation 
with alternative voting systems, but in recent years local governments have emerged as leaders in 
campaign finance regulation and in testing the limits of the restrictions on campaign finance 
limitations adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.39 As at the federal and 
state levels, local interest in campaign financing mostly began in the aftermath of the Watergate 
scandal, and there were locally-adopted regulations of the financing of local election campaigns as 
early as 1974.40 A recent survey by the National Civic League found that 135 city and county 
governments in eighteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted their own campaign finance 
laws. Although these measures vary considerably from community to community, collectively they 
deal with all the major elements of campaign finance regulation – disclosure, contribution limitations, 
                                                 
36 Ferndale for Instant Runoff Voting, “Ferndale MI Voters Overwhelmingly Pass Proposal B to Authorize Instant 
Runoff Voting (IRV),” (Nov. 2, 2004) (IRV proposal passes by a margin of 69.75% to 30.25%) available at 
http://www.firv.org/pressreleases/ propbpasses110204.html. 
37 See FAIR VOTE IRV AMERICA, IRV in Vermont, at http://www.fairvote.org/index.php?page=1453&articlemode= 
showspecific&showarticle=789. 
38 See FAIR VOTE IRV AMERICA, IRV in Takoma Park, at http://www.fairvote.org/?page= 1689. 
39 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
40 See, e.g., Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 217 F.Supp. 2d 1197, 1200 (D.N.M. 2002) (noting that Albuquerque 
had adopted campaign spending limits in 1974). 
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expenditure limitations, and the provision of public funds to qualifying candidates.41 Contribution 
limitations are particularly widespread, and are found in roughly 115 localities.42 
Local campaign reform measures have been daring, innovative, and wide-ranging. Two local 
governments challenged head-on the Supreme Court’s determination in Buckley that expenditure 
limitations are unconstitutional. Albuquerque, New Mexico enacted spending limits for candidates for 
local office in 1974 and, amazingly enough, despite Buckley those limits remained on the books and 
were apparently enforced through 1995. The limits were temporarily enjoined in 1997, but were 
amended and restored in 1999.43  When a mayoral candidate sought to enjoin their enforcement in the 
2001 race, the federal district court initially denied the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, 
concluding that the plaintiff had shown neither a likelihood of success on the merits nor that the public 
interest would benefit from an injunction.44  The court found on the record that for more than two 
decades the Albuquerque spending limits had promoted competitive elections, increased citizen 
confidence in government, led to high voter turnout, reduced the role of large donors, created 
opportunities for lower-income and lower-middle-income candidates, and generally improved the 
quality of electoral campaigns without limiting the ability of candidates to campaign effectively.45 
Based on that record, the court found the city had demonstrated its spending limits were necessary to 
                                                 
41 See NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, LOCAL CAMPAIGN FIN. REFORM (Feb. 2002), 
http://www.ncl.org/npp/lcf/inventory.html. Roughly two-thirds of the cities and counties that adopted campaign 
finance measures are in California. Other states where multiple local governments have been active in campaign 
finance reform include Colorado, Ohio, Washington, Maryland, Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, and Utah.  
42 See id. 
43 Homans, 217 F.Supp. 2d at 1200 (D.N.M. 2002). 
44 Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 160 F.Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M. 2001). 
45 Id. at 1268–70.  
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promote the compelling governmental interest in “preserving the public faith in democracy, and 
reducing the appearance of corruption.”46  Less than a week later, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed 
and held that the compelling government interests identified by the district court were “really no 
different than the interests deemed insufficient to justify expenditure limitations in Buckley”47 and 
granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Albuquerque limits.  
Subsequently, the district court conducted a full trial on the merits. The court found that 
unlimited campaign spending interfered with competitive elections by aiding incumbents, noting that 
in Albuquerque all the mayors seeking reelection since the adoption of spending limits had been 
defeated, compared with the 88% reelection rate of incumbent mayors in other cities.48  The court 
again found that turnout in municipal elections had been higher in Albuquerque under spending limits 
than in other cities without spending limits, that spending limits encourage electoral competition,49 
and that Albuquerque voters think their spending-limited elections are less influenced by special 
interest money than un-limited-spending federal elections.50  Ultimately, however, the court concluded 
that based on the Tenth Circuit’s earlier decision it was “constrained to find” that the city’s 
expenditure limits were unconstitutional,51 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.52  
                                                 
46 Id. at 1272. 
47 Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 264 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001). 
48 Homans, 217 F.Supp. 2d at 1200. 
49 Id. at 1206. In the un-limited 2001 mayoral election, the second- and third-place finishers – 
who each received more votes than the incumbent mayor who unsuccessfully sought reelection, 
and who together received more votes than the winner – each spent less money than the enjoined 
spending limit would have allowed. See id. at 1203. The winning candidate, however, spent more 
than the double the spending limit. Id. 
50 Id. at 1201. 
51 Id. at 1206. 
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Like Albuquerque, the City of Cincinnati also adopted spending limits on city council 
candidates notwithstanding Buckley.  That 1995 action appears to have been motivated in part by a 
desire to challenge Buckley.53 In the constitutional litigation that followed, the city presented evidence 
that wealthy donors dominated the financing of city elections, and that the overwhelming majority of 
local residents believed that large contributors wield undue influence over the local political system.54 
The Sixth Circuit, however, held that Buckley “foreclose[d] . . . as a matter of law”55 most of the city’s 
arguments and invalidated the ordinance. 
Some localities, while acting clearly within the contours of Buckley, have sought to develop 
innovative approaches to the problems posed by campaign money.56 Several communities – including 
Richland, Washington, and Alta, Utah – have adopted voluntary spending limits with teeth.  In 
Richland, a local ordinance asks candidates to abide by maximum expenditure limitations, and directs 
the city clerk to monitor spending levels, and publish in the local newspaper an advertisement 
indicating who is in compliance and who is not.57 Alta, similarly, directs the city clerk to publicize 
which candidates have agreed to comply with voluntary limits and which have not. Westminster, 
                                                                                                                                                                
52 Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004). 
53 Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 910 (6th Cir. 1998). 
54 Id. at 911. 
55 Id. at 915. One member of the Kruse panel, however, took issue with the panel’s reasoning and raised the 
suggestion that spending limitations could also be justified by “the interest in preserving faith in democracy.” Id. at 
919 (Cohn, D.J., concurring).  
56 Pitkin County, Colorado also challenged Buckley when, in 1996, a voter initiative amended its charter to impose a 
spending limit in local elections. When the constitutionality of the provision was challenged on the eve of the 2000 
elections, the county attorney, concerned about the measure’s constitutionality, declined to enforce it. See NAT’L 
CIVIC LEAGUE, ADDENDUM TO LOCAL CAMPAIGN FIN. REFORM: ADDITIONAL CASE STUDIES 14–15 (2001), 
http://www.ncl.org/npp/lcfr/lcfr_addendum.pdf.  
57 NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, LOCAL CAMPAIGN FIN. REFORM: CASE STUDIES, INNOVATIVE AND MODEL LEGISLATION, 
(2005), http://www.ncl.org/npp/lcfr/lcfr_first_ed_ summary.html.  
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Colorado amended its city charter to include a stringent conflict of interests rule that precludes any 
city councillor from both voting and participating in debate on any issue or matter coming before the 
Council “involving a benefit” to any person who donated $100 or more to the councillor’s campaign.58 
Contributions above the conflict-of-interest threshold fell by fifty percent from the election before the 
adoption of the charter amendment to the election after.59 
More important, perhaps, than either the direct challenge to Buckley posed by municipal 
spending limits or the alternative forms of regulation promoted by these smaller cities, local 
governments have taken the lead in implementing, experimenting with, and demonstrating the efficacy 
of the potentially most significant campaign finance reform – public funding of campaigns.  Unlike 
contribution limits, expenditure limits, or disclosure, only public funding can effectively reduce the 
dependence of candidates on large private donations, limit the impact of large donors on the electoral 
process, provide newcomers and challengers with the funds they need to be competitive, and 
ameliorate the burdens of fundraising that discourage many potential candidates from running while 
forcing others to spend more of their time with potential large donors than with the general public.60 
At the national level, there is public funding only in the presidential election, but the low level 
of funding provided and other technical features of the system have increasingly discouraged 
candidates from participating, particularly in the primary phase of the presidential election.61 Several 
                                                 
58 See id. The recusal requirement does not apply where the benefit to the donor is “merely incidental to an issue or 
question involving the common public good.” The Westminster charter amendment, which was adopted in 1996, 
bears a close resemblance to the “recusal alternative” to contribution limits proposed by Professor John Copeland 
Nagle a few years later. See John Copeland Nagel, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 69 (2000). 
59 See ADDENDUM, supra note 57, at 45–47. 
60 See generally Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563 (1999).  
61 See id. at 586–89. 
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states have also adopted partial public funding programs, although until recently most states that 
provided for some form of public funding offered candidates only modest grants, and most limited 
public funding to candidates for governor.62 It is local government that has really taken the lead in 
exploring public funding. Sixteen cities or counties have adopted public funding programs, and twelve 
of those programs are currently operating.63 
Public funding programs have been adopted in cities large – New York City, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco – midsize – Austin, Texas, Portland, Oregon,64  Tucson, Arizona – and small, Cary, North 
Carolina, and Petaluma, California. The New York, Los Angeles, and Tucson programs have been 
considered particularly successful.65  Tucson’s system has been in operation the longest – since 1985 – 
                                                 
62 See MICHAEL L. MALBIN & THOMAS GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN FIN. LESSONS FROM 
THE STATES 51–75 (1998). Hawaii, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have for some time provided some public funds to 
legislative candidates, but only Minnesota provides sufficiently public money to make the program attractive to 
candidates. See id. at 58, 71. The more recently adopted “clean money” reforms in Arizona and Maine have been far 
more ambitious and more comprehensive in providing support for state legislative candidates. See UNITED STATES 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CAMPAIGN FIN. REFORM: EARLY EXPERIENCES OF TWO STATES THAT OFFER FULL 
PUBLIC FUNDING FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES (May 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03453.pdf 
(analyzing Arizona and Maine public funding programs). 
63 See Ryan, supra note 6, at 4. Of the four programs no longer in operation, three were terminated as the result of 
state-level voter initiatives, two in Washington state and one in California. As I will discuss below, there is a good 
argument that the California measure was terminated erroneously by a state court. Sacramento County had adopted 
public funding in 1986. In 1988, California voters passed Proposition 73, which banned the payment of public funds 
to candidates. In 1990, an intermediate California appellate court held that this preempted the Sacramento public 
funding system. County of Sacramento v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n., 271 Cal. Rptr. 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
However, two years later, in a case in which Proposition 73 was used to challenge Los Angeles’ public funding 
system, the California Supreme Court upheld the Los Angeles public funding program and labeled the Sacramento 
decision – which was possibly distinguishable because it involved a county and not a home rule city – “highly 
questionable.” Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990, 1001 (Cal. 1992).  The fourth defunct public funding program, in 
Cincinnati Ohio, was terminated by a local ballot measure.  See CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUD., PUBLIC 
FINANCING LAWS IN LOCAL JURISDICTIONS 5 n.1 (2005) available at http://www.cgs.org/publications/docs/ 
PublicFinancingLaws2005.pdf. 
64 As of this writing, Portland is the most recent major city to have adopted public funding. In May 2005, the city 
council passed an ordinance creating a voluntary public funding system for city auditor, city commissioner, and mayor. 
The first election to be held with public funding is the May 2006 primary. See PUBLICLY FINANCED CAMPAIGNS IN 
PORTLAND – ORDINANCE AND REPORT, available at http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?c=37740. 
65 See RYAN, supra note 1. See also PAUL RYAN, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUD., ELEVEN YEARS OF REFORM: 
MANY SUCCESSES-MORE TO BE DONE, CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES (2001), available at 
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while the New York and Los Angeles systems date back to 1988 and 1990 respectively.  In all three 
systems, public matching funds are provided to qualifying candidates who agree to comply with 
spending limits and abide by various administrative requirements. In Tucson, New York, and Los 
Angeles, public funds are available for candidates for all municipal offices, and both the public match 
and the spending limit have been sufficiently attractive to candidates that in recent years most serious 
candidates have chosen to participate.66 These programs have reduced candidates’ dependence on 
large private donations and increased the role of small donors;67 expanded the ability of women, 
people of color, and grass-roots candidates to run for office;68 and have generally contributed to more 
competitive municipal elections.69  
These cities and the other communities using public funding have experimented in interesting 
ways with how to determine which candidates qualify for public funds, how much to give candidates, 
how to distribute the funds, and how to finance and administer their programs.70 Thus, Los Angeles 
has demonstrated the benefits of a public financing trust fund – adopted as a charter amendment – in 
                                                                                                                                                                
http://www.cgs.org/publications/docs/lacamp_fin.pdf [hereinafter RYAN, ELEVEN YEARS]; PAUL RYAN, CENTER FOR 
GOVERNMENTAL STUD., POLITICAL REFORM THAT WORKS: PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING BLOOMS IN TUCSON 
(2003), available at http://www.cgs.org/publications/ docs/Political_Reform_That_Works.pdf [hereinafter RYAN, 
PUBLIC FINANCING BLOOMS]. 
66 See RYAN, supra note 1, at 21–23 (candidate participation rate was 79% in New York City in 2001 elections); 
RYAN, ELEVEN YEARS, supra note 66, at 18–19 (serious candidate participation in Los Angeles was 70% in 2001); 
RYAN, PUBLIC FINANCING BLOOMS, supra note 66, at 9–11 (100% participation rate in Tucson program in 2001 and 
2003 elections). 
67 See RYAN, supra note 1, at 15–18; RYAN, ELEVEN YEARS, supra note 66, at 21–23, 26–28. 
68 See RYAN, supra note 1, at 18–21; RYAN, ELEVEN YEARS, supra note 66, at 23–24.  
69 See RYAN, PUBLIC FINANCING BLOOMS, supra note 66, at 19–21. 
70 See Ryan, supra note 6, at 7–11. 
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assuring a “consistent and reliable” source of funding.”71 Tucson has shown that administration of the 
program by the city clerk, rather than a separate ethics commission or campaign finance board, can be 
an effective and professional way of implementing public funding.72 And New York has indicated that 
public grants plus spending limits need not be a pro-incumbent device, as some critics of public 
funding have suggested.73 By amending its law in 1998 to provide an unprecedented $4-to-$1 match 
for individual donations of $250 or less from New York City residents, the city council not only 
democratized campaign funding but also contributed to the increased competitiveness of city council 
elections.74 And several of the cities that provide public funding– including Austin and San Francisco  
as well as Los Angeles and New York – have sought to use public funds to improve the quality of 
municipal election campaigns by requiring candidates who participate in the public funding program 
to participate in public debates.75  
The various city and county public funding programs have also had to address a central 
challenge to all public funding programs – the ability of nonparticipating candidates, including 
wealthy, self-funded office seekers, and independent committees to engage in unlimited spending. 
Certainly, Michael Bloomberg’s expenditure of $73 million of his personal fortune in his quest for the 
                                                 
71 New York’s law provides another model for a program funding mechanism “equally well insulated from political 
pressures.” See RYAN, supra note 1, at 28; RYAN, Eleven Years, supra note 66, at 25. 
72 See RYAN, PUBLIC FINANCING BLOOMS, supra note 66, at 16. On the other hand, New York’s Campaign Finance 
Board suggests than an independent administrative body can also do a very successful job. See RYAN, supra note 1, 
at 31–34. 
73 See BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 98–102 (2001). 
74 See RYAN, supra note 1, at 15–18. 
75 See Ryan, supra note 6, at 11–12. 
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New York mayoralty in 2001 indicates the limits of any voluntary funding and limits system.76 To deal 
with the challenge posed by high-spending non-participants, Austin, Los Angeles, Oakland, and San 
Francisco eliminate the spending limit in any electoral contest when independent expenditures 
designed to influence that race exceed a specified amount.77 New York eliminates the spending limit 
when a participating candidate faces a nonparticipating opponent who receives contributions or makes 
expenditures in excess of 50% of the spending limit, and it also increases the public match.  As a result 
of the amendments enacted in 2004 the match rate was raised from 5-to-1 to 6-to-1. Potentially more 
significantly, the law now permits a participating candidate facing a high-spending non-participating 
opponent to receive a public grant of up to 125% of the spending limit.78  
As with IRV, it would be a mistake to treat these local campaign finance reforms, including the 
local public funding initiatives, as panaceas. Campaign finance rules are only a small piece of a 
political system, and will have a limited, even if real, effect on local politics. But these initiatives do 
demonstrate the willingness and capacity of localities across the country to undertake significant 
reform in a highly contested area and provide important evidence of the wide range of possible 
innovations and different approaches to common problems. 
                                                 
76 To be sure, Bloomberg’s opponent, Mark Green, spent $16.2 million (including $4.5 million in public funds) in 
the same election, which was more money than any successful candidate for New York mayor had ever spent, other 
than Bloomberg. NEED CITE 
77 Ryan, supra note 6, at 11.  
78 The law appears to have had little impact on Mayor Bloomberg’s campaign spending. In 2005, he spent $84 million 
– or $10 million more than in 2001 – on his successful reelection campaign. See Jim Rutenberg, Bloomberg Spent $84 
Million To Remain Mayor, a Record, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006, at B2. Even with the City’s generous matching 
program, Bloomberg’s 2005 general election opponent, Fernando Ferrer, raised only $5.3 million in private 
contributions and received just $3.9 million in public financing. Ferrer’s total spending was just $9.1 million. Public 
funding accounted for approximately 42% of Ferrer’s total funding. See Sam Roberts, Offers of Coal for the Mayor’s 




D. Other Local Innovations in the Local Governance Structure 
This subsection is even more unsystematic than the previous ones, since it relies to a 
significant degree on recent judicial decisions in which locally initiated changes in the organization or 
procedures of local government have been subject to legal challenge. As a result, it does not consider 
local structural revisions that have avoided legal attack. Still, even this brief survey indicates some 
local willingness and capacity to depart from the state-prescribed rules and procedures for local 
government operations. 
One important example of this is the local adoption of term limits for local officials, even in the 
absence of any state provision for term limits.79 Local governments have also changed the size of the 
local legislature,80 altered the rules for filling vacancies in local office,81 and subjected state-created 
local offices – like the coroner and register of wills – to local accountability, hiring, conduct, and 
ethics codes and local reporting requirements.82 Other local measures have imposed distinctive local 
conflict of interest rules,83 changed election procedures,84 and adopted specific local procedures for 
                                                 
79 See, e.g., Roth v. Cuevas, 624 N.E.2d 689 (N.Y. 1993) (discussing term limits adopted by voter initiative in New 
York City); Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (describing a charter 
provision that imposed a two-term limit on mayor and council members). But cf. Cottrell v. Santillanes, 901 P.2d 785 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (invalidating Albuquerque charter amendment imposing term limit on city councilors). 
80 See e.g., State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 845 P.2d 150 (N.M. 1992) (upholding decision by City of Clovis to 
expand city commission to eight members, notwithstanding state law setting city commission size at five). 
81 See, e.g., Westchester County Civ. Serv. Employees Ass’n v. Del Bello, 393 N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 1979); Resnick v. 
County of Ulster, 376 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1978). 
82 See, e.g., Wecht v. Roddey, 815 A.2d 1146 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); accord, Lennox v. Clark, 93 A.2d 834 (Pa. 
1953) (holding that the consolidation of the city and county of Philadelphia made county register of wills, coroner, 
and recorder of deeds into city officers who could be subject to the city’s civil service and reporting requirements 
and the city’s prohibition on partisan political activities). 
83 See, e.g., Golden v. Clark, 564 N.E.2d 611 (N.Y. 1990) (sustaining city charter provision prohibiting city officials 
from holding party office); Suffolk County Ethics Comm’n. v. Neppell, 762 N.Y.S.2d 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) 
(upholding county law that imposed more stringent financial disclosure rules than state law).  
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local legislation,85 local budget review,86 approval of franchises,87 and consideration of tax increases.88 
There is no consistent thread in the local measures, and no consistent theme in the difference between 
local and state approaches to these questions. Some local measures might provide for more direct 
popular involvement in local decision-making,89 while others provide less.90 More substantively, a 
handful of California cases reveal local government efforts to make it easier to impose new local taxes 
than the state of California, directed by Proposition 13 and its progeny, would allow.91 Perhaps the 
dominant impression is simply one of local tinkering with the rules and procedures of local 
governance, particularly with regard to elections, ethics, employees, budget and taxation, in light of 
particular local needs, preferences, and circumstances. 
                                                                                                                                                                
84 See, e.g., In re Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2002) (finding that City of San Juan’s home rule charter allowed 
candidates for the city commission to file up to thirty days before election day, although state law set the filing 
deadline at forty-five days before election day). 
85 See, e.g., Windham Taxpayers Ass’n v. Windham, 662 A.2d 1281 (Conn. 1995) (finding that town charter 
permissibly made it more difficult to bring a matter to the town meeting, and thereby override an action of the board 
of selectmen, than under state law). 
86 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Town & Borough of Naugatuck, 843 A.2d 603 (Conn. 2004) (upholding town charter 
that provided for separate referendum votes on education and general town budget, despite state law providing for 
referendum on combined education and general budget); School Comm. v. Town of York, 626 A.2d 935 (Me. 1993) 
(holding that town charter governs procedure for adopting school budget). 
87 See City of Houston v. Todd, 41 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. App. 2001) (finding that municipal procedure for approving 
light rail franchise, not state law setting procedure for street franchises, governs). 
88 See, e.g., Traders Sports, Inc. v. City of San Leandro, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (permitting city 
to submit tax increase proposal to voters on approval of simple majority of council, not the two-thirds that state law 
requires). 
89 See, e.g., Naugatuck, 843 A.2d at 606 (upholding town provision providing for direct referendum review of the 
school budget). 
90 See, e.g., Todd, 41 S.W.3d 289 (upholding city provision for approving franchise that eliminated voter approval); 
Windham Taxpayers Ass’n, 662 A.2d 1281 (upholding town charter that made it more difficult for residents to force 
a town meeting review of an appropriation approved by the board of selectmen).  
91 See, e.g., Traders Sports, Inc., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677; see also Fisher v. County of Alameda, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384 




III. Local Political Reform in the Courts: Home Rule and Preemption 
Not all local efforts at political innovation provoke legal challenge. Thus, I am not aware of 
any court decisions concerning San Francisco’s adoption of IRV, Tucson’s longstanding public 
funding system, or New York City’s campaign finance law – although New York City’s most recent 
effort to extend its contribution restrictions and disclosure requirements to candidates who do not 
participate in the voluntary public funding system opens it to legal attack. Moreover, some challenges 
to local political innovations concern not the scope of local autonomy but other state constitutional 
constraints. Thus, the principal argument against Seattle’s program to provide public funds to 
candidates in municipal elections was premised on the state constitution’s public purpose requirement 
for spending public dollars.92 Similarly, Albuquerque’s term limits provision was asserted to be 
inconsistent with the rules for holding office spelled out in the New Mexico Constitution’s 
Qualifications Clause.93  
Still, local political reform measures have frequently implicated the scope of local autonomy. 
As is typically the case with local legislation, these questions concern both the power of the locality to 
adopt the measure in the first place in the absence of express state authorization and whether other 
state laws addressing the same subject matter preempt local action.  State courts have consistently 
found that the local political innovations have fallen within the local power to initiate. Indeed, the 
courts have on occasion waxed lyrical on the almost tautological connection between home rule and 
                                                 
92 See City of Seattle v. State, 668 P.2d 1266 (Wash. 1983). 
93 See Cottrell v. Santillanes, 901 P.2d 785 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). 
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local control over governance procedures.94 Even courts least interested in immunizing local initiatives 
from state displacement have been willing to assume that the power “to organize the local political 
entity, to establish its governing organs, their selection, their powers, and their limits” is at the heart of 
the local autonomy provided by home rule.95  
The real question has been preemption. Sometimes the preemption problem is posed by a 
specific state law clearly targeting the type of local ordinance in question. Los Angeles, for example, 
adopted its public funding system shortly after the state’s voters had passed a ban on public funding of 
candidates. More frequently, the arguably conflicting state law is part of a general state code 
concerning the rules and procedures for local elections, or prescribing budget practices or governance 
procedures.  Most states have adopted such local government or local election codes. Functionally, 
these codes can provide a useful framework or model for local governments. Particularly for the many 
small local governments that may lack the legal and financial resources to engage in extensive 
research and develop their own forms, they constitute a ready-made “off the shelf” governmental and 
electoral structure. These localities need not reinvent the wheel but can simply use the rules and 
procedures the state has provided. More formally, it would be difficult to deny that the state has an 
interest in assuring fair procedures and workable local government structures for its residents who live 
within municipalities or counties and depend upon those localities for government services. Although 
these laws address core local matters, they are, by the same token, also matters of state concern. In the 
many localities where there is no conflict between the general state code and a special local ordinance, 
there would be no question that the state has the legal authority to address these matters. 
                                                 
94 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Town & Borough of Naugatuck, 843 A.2d 603, 611–12 (Conn. 2004). 
95 City of La Grande v. Public Employees Ret. Bd., 586 P.2d 765, 767–68 (Or. 1978). 
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Thus, these local political innovation cases have forced state courts to grapple with the 
problem of local legislation dealing with a matter of core local concern that conflicts with a legitimate 
state concern with local matters. Based on our usual assumptions about the limited scope of local 
autonomy, that would appear to be a recipe for state preemption and local defeat.  Instead, to a 
surprising degree, state courts have enabled the local interest in determining the structures and 
procedures of local politics and governance to prevail. Either the courts have engaged in balancing and 
concluded that the local interest outweighs the state’s, or they have strained to read the relevant state 
laws as implicitly permitting local departures from the state-prescribed norm. 
Strikingly, two of the classic distinctions in home rule thinking – whether home rule is based 
on a state constitutional provision96 or only a state statute,97 or whether the home rule is of the imperio 
form vesting localities with both initiative and immunity from inconsistent laws on the same subject or 
merely of the legislative form, granting broad initiative powers but making them subject to state 
legislative preemption98 – appear not to matter much. Local governments have prevailed even when 
their home rule is statutory, or of the legislative constitutional form. What really seems to matter is the 
judicial recognition that local control of local governance or politics is both of central importance to 
the local self-determination that is home rule while simultaneously posing little or no threat or cost to 
                                                 
96 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990, 993 (Cal. 1992). 
97 See, e.g., Naugatuck, 843 A.2d 603 (discussing a Connecticut town’s home rule based on a statute); School 
Comm. v. Town of York, 626 A.2d 935 (Me. 1993) (discussing a Maine town’s home rule based on statutory 
authority). 
98 Compare Johnson, 841 P.2d at 993 (finding no preemption under California’s constitution, which provides for 
local power with respect to municipal affairs) with State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 845 P.2d 150, 154 (N.M. 1992) 
(finding no preemption under New Mexico constitution, which provides that home rule does not apply to “legislative 
powers . . . denied by general law”). On imperio and legislative home rule generally, see Kenneth Vanlandingham, 
Constitutional Home Rule Since the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1975); Kenneth 
Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1968). 
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the localities or the state beyond local borders. In other words, if it is a question of local political 
structure and there are no external effects and no state harm from intrastate variations, local 
innovations can prevail notwithstanding the conflict with state law.  
A. Balancing of State and Local Interests 
The most striking case involving the express balancing of state and local interests in local 
election regulation is Johnson v. Bradley, in which the California Supreme Court upheld Los 
Angeles’s municipal candidate public funding program in the teeth of the voter-initiated Proposition 
73, a state-wide measure that flatly banned the public funding of any election campaign.99 The court 
found that the Los Angeles measure easily fell within the state constitution’s grant to charter cities – 
such as Los Angeles – of plenary authority to “make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in 
respect to municipal affairs.”100 The court, however, also acknowledged that the “the integrity of the 
electoral process, at both the state and local level, is undoubtedly a statewide concern.”101 As the court 
noted, without such an understanding it would be difficult to sustain the application of statewide 
campaign finance disclosure provisions or conflict of interest rules to charter cities that have not 
adopted their own disclosure or ethics laws.102 The court, however, declined to defer to the state’s 
mere assertion of a theoretical interest in local electoral integrity. In light of the local self-governance 
interest at stake, the court required the state to demonstrate both that the state law is “reasonably 
calculated to resolve such statewide concerns,” and “narrowly tailored to intrude as little as possible 
                                                 
99 841 P.2d at 991. 
100 Id. at 994. 
101 Id. at 1003. 
102 Id. at 1001 n.18, 1003.  
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on legitimate local interests.”103 Because the petitioners failed to cite any evidence that the ban on 
public funding in political campaigns “advances in any way the goal of enhancing the integrity of the 
local electoral process,”104 the court concluded that the municipal interest in structuring local elections 
outweighs the asserted state interest in local integrity.105  
In the course of its analysis, the court also gave considerable weight to the local scope of the 
Los Angeles measure – that is, that it affected only Los Angeles and not other localities or the state 
itself. The challengers to local public funding asserted that the state’s ban on public funding would 
serve the statewide concern of “the protection of the public fisc.” 106 The court acknowledged that the 
“conservation of the state’s limited funds is a statewide concern,” but it emphasized that the public 
funds in question were entirely municipal: There is “nothing that is of greater municipal concern than 
how a city’s tax dollars will be spent; nor anything which could be of less interest to taxpayers of other 
jurisdictions.”107 The lack of external effects offset the finding of a state concern and supported the  
conclusion that local funding of local candidates is primarily a local matter. 
Johnson’s balancing of state and local interests affected other cases involving political 
innovation in California. In Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach, the court of appeal, relying on 
                                                 
103 Id. at 1001, n.18. 
104 Id. at 1003. 
105 The lack of evidence that a public funding ban promotes the integrity of elections suggests that Proposition 73 is 
of questionable value for state elections, too. However, as the court considered the benefits of the public funding ban 
only against the countervailing interest in municipal home rule, Johnson did not affect Proposition 73’s applicability 
to state elections. 
106 Id. at 1001. 
107 Id. at 1002. 
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Johnson, upheld a charter city’s adoption of term limits for its mayor and council members. 108 The 
court explained that the “manner of election” of municipal officers is a core municipal affair,109 so that 
the adoption of term limits easily fell within the home rule grant. By the same token, the court also 
found that the extensive state specification of the qualifications for holding local office – which did 
not include term limits – was intended by the state to occupy the field of municipal office eligibility.110 
Despite the head-on conflict, the local term limit prevailed because the predominant interest was local. 
As the court noted, the “persons primarily affected . . . are City council members and residents. 
Council members can only exercise the City’s police powers within the City, and [the term limits 
provision] has at most a minimal extraterritorial effect.”111 There was no need for a uniform state law 
on local term limits – and no harm from local variation – because “term limits for City officials have 
to do solely with local concerns.”112 To be sure, there was some state interest in the terms of municipal 
officeholders, given that municipal decisions inevitably affect nonresidents “who enter a city, or work 
or own property in it.”113 Those concerns underscored the state’s general interest in the quality of local 
government – concerns which support the legitimacy of the many state laws dealing with eligibility to 
                                                 
108 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). Art. XI, §5 of the California Constitution is the source of the 
home rule power for charter cities. Cal. Const. art. XI, §5. Subsection (a) provides such cities with plenary power 
over “municipal affairs.” Id. Subsection (b)(4)specifically empowers charter cities to regulate the “manner” by which 
city officials are elected. Id. Cawdrey rooted Redondo Beach’s term limits authority in the “manner” subsection. 
Interestingly, the California Supreme Court in Johnson, after considerable consideration of the “manner” subsection, 
relied instead on the more general “municipal affairs” power. Johnson, 841 P.2d at 998–99. 
109 Cawdrey, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179, 188. 
110 Id. at 186; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that the United States 
Constitution’s eligibility requirements to serve in Congress bar state imposition of term limits on its congressional 
representatives). 
111 Cawdrey, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 187. 
 
 29 
serve in local government. But if these concerns are treated as controlling then “virtually all aspects of 
modern city government are of statewide concern” and that would “nullify” the state constitution’s 
grant of home rule.114 Protecting home rule required the court to treat the greater local interest as 
determinative. 
The lack of significant extralocal concern also proved dispositive in another recent California 
case, Traders Sports, Inc. v. City of San Leandro,115 in which the court upheld a local three percent 
gross receipts tax on businesses that sell concealable firearms and ammunition for concealable 
firearms. The city council had adopted the measure by a simple majority vote and then submitted it to 
the city’s voters, who approved it.116 However, as a result of Proposition 62, a voter-initiated statewide 
statute, state law requires a two-thirds council vote, as well as voter approval, in order to adopt or 
increase local taxes.117  The court found that the local measure and the state law were in direct 
conflict.118 Following Johnson v. Bradley, the court emphasized both the predominant local concern in 
the procedures for adopting local taxation and the state statute’s lack of narrow tailoring to advance 
the state’s asserted concern with promoting voter control over taxation.119  First, the court noted that 
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the question of the percentage of council votes needed to put a measure on the ballot “is precisely the 
sort of matter to fall within the decision-making power of a home rule municipality. It is a subject that 
is predominantly, if not entirely, of interest to the citizens of San Leandro.”120 Indeed, in a classic 
statement of the theory of home rule, the court rhetorically asked: 
After all, who else can best determine the proper balance between the powers 
delegated to the elected representatives of San Leandro to propose a local tax measure, 
and the powers reserved to the residents of San Leandro to enact such a tax measure? 
Certainly, it is the people of San Leandro, who are familiar with local conditions, who 
are best able to regulate such matters by means of charter provisions and municipal 
codes.121 
 
On the other hand, the court assumed that the statute did address an area of legitimate state 
concern – increasing voters’ control over taxation. However, as the San Leandro procedure still gave 
the ultimate power to approve or reject a new tax to the voters, the state statute’s requirement of a two-
thirds council vote before the measure could even be considered by the voters was “not narrowly 
calculated” to advance the state’s interest “while at the same time it invades the right of a charter city 
to conduct local elections – an area that is historically a municipal affair.”122 As a result “San Leandro 
is constitutionally empowered to require a voting majority different from that set out in [state law].”123 
The balancing technique – with the local interest in local self-governance dominating over 
state concerns – is not unique to California. In Connecticut, the state supreme court has repeatedly 
upheld local measures that apparently conflict with general state laws setting out rules for local 
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governance on the theory that these are matters of predominant local concern.  Thus, the court ruled 
that the town of Windham could by charter provision make it more difficult for local residents to force 
a local referendum vote on a budget matter than state law would have allowed.  The court 
acknowledged the conflict between the state and local measures, and did not doubt the authority of 
either the state or the locality to legislate concerning the issue. It concluded that because the question 
of referral to the voters is a “matter of local concern,” state law did not preempt the conflicting charter 
provision.124 The court noted that the rationale for home rule is that “issues of local concern are most 
logically answered locally, pursuant to a home rule charter, exclusive of the provisions of the General 
Statutes.”125  The court continued:  
[W]hether Windham’s primary legislative body – the board of selectmen – can be 
compelled to hold a referendum on the petition of the town’s voters . . . is of purely 
local interest . . . in that it relates to concerns that are of particular importance to the 
town itself. It is of no import to the rest of Connecticut whether the town of 
Windham…holds a second referendum.126  
 
More recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the authority of the town of Naugatuck 
to provide for separate referenda on the education budget and the rest of the town budget rather than 
hold a referendum on an integrated general spending-plus-education budget, as provided by state law. 
The court found that the state and local measures conflicted but determined that the town provision 
prevailed as “matters concerning a town budget are of local rather than statewide concern.”127 While 
both education and education spending are matters of statewide concern, to protect local autonomy the 
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court defined the area of conflict not as the broad field of education finance but, more narrowly,  as 
“the particular procedure pursuant to which a municipality adopts its budget, including the procedure 
it employs in adopting the education component of the budget.”128 Although the state could impose 
substantive educational mandates, the local education budget procedure, which has no effect outside 
the municipality, “is not itself a matter of statewide concern.”129 
In State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem,130 the New Mexico Supreme Court took a particularly 
creative approach to balancing a state-local conflict over the size of the Clovis city commission. New 
Mexico law provided that commissions should have five members; Clovis wanted an eight-member 
body.131 The court asked whether the state law was a “general” one, which, under the New Mexico 
constitution, would displace an inconsistent local measure. Although the state law was certainly 
general in form – it provided simply that a municipality having a commissioner-manager form of 
government is to have five commissioners, it applied generally throughout the state, and it did not 
make exceptions for any municipality or category of municipalities – the court determined “[e]ven if a 
statute applies to all municipalities throughout the state, it is not necessarily a general law if it does not 
relate to a matter of statewide concern.”132 Although “[d]etermining whether a matter is of statewide 
or local concern is not always an easy task,”133 the court “easily conclude[d] that the subject is of local 
concern.” As the court noted, the size of the governing body of Clovis has little significance outside 
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the city limits. “It is a subject that is predominately, if not entirely, of interest to the citizens of the 
City of Clovis.”134 As a result, the city could have eight commissioners, notwithstanding the 
inconsistency with state law. 
In these balancing cases, the courts upheld local efforts to change basic aspects of local 
government structure or procedure or local elections, despite a conflict with state law, on a finding that 
the matter was both part of the core of local self-determination and had little or no effect on the state  
concerns underlying the inconsistent state legislation. As a result, the local measures could prevail for 
those localities choosing to break with the state’s approach, while the state laws remained in effect for 
all the other localities which had not attempted to depart from them. 
B. Finding No State Intent to Preclude Local Variation 
The other principal technique state courts have used to sustain local political innovations that 
are arguably inconsistent with state laws has been to find that the state did not intend to preclude local 
variation from the state-prescribed norm. One version of this, nicely articulated by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine, has been to treat the state’s laws governing local government organization as 
a model, but not a mandate for local compliance.  
Thus, the Town of York, Maine adopted a number of charter provisions – dealing with such 
issues as the budget committee, secret ballot voting, recall elections, and the election of the moderator 
for town referenda – which departed from general state laws. The court noted that many of these 
legislative provisions pre-dated the statutory expansion of home rule and found a statement in the 
legislative history to the home rule expansion act that observed that state law “[p]rovisions which do 
not limit home rule power, but may serve as a useful guide to municipalities are retained, but with an 
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express recognition of municipal home rule authority to act otherwise.”135 Relying on the legislative 
history, the court found that not all state laws concerning local governance are binding commands. 
Instead, some are mere “models” from which a locality is free to depart. Moreover, “not all ‘model’ 
provisions were so labeled.”136 Indeed, none of the arguably conflicting state law provisions in the 
York case had been explicitly designated as a model. However, because the charter provisions at issue 
advanced local autonomy without conflicting with the state purposes underlying the state law, the 
court found that the state laws could be treated as “models” rather than binding commands that would 
displace inconsistent local laws. In other words, not only did the court find that the legislature intended 
to create two types of laws dealing with home rule localities – models and preemptive directives, but it 
concluded that these state rules and procedures dealing with local governance would be treated as  
models unless the state expressly articulated an intent to preempt. 
Other state courts have reached a similar result by adopting a kind of state constitutional or 
state legislative “clear statement” doctrine as a precondition for preemption of local actions 
concerning local government structure.  Thus, the New York court of appeals concluded that under the 
state’s revised and expanded home rule constitutional amendment of 1964, county governments enjoy 
the power to fill vacancies in county legislative offices, notwithstanding conflicting state laws that 
gave that power to the state legislature.137  The court found there was no “clearly articulated decision 
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by the State legislature to intrude upon a domain which county legislatures presumptively control.”138 
As the court suggested, “the spirit of home rule” envisioned that localities would enjoy “great 
autonomy in experimenting with the manner in which their local officers, including legislative 
officers, were to be chosen.”139 Such local control would allow the counties to “choose that structure 
of local government which is best tailored to serve particular community needs.”140  In the absence of 
convincing evidence that the general constitutional provision authorizing the legislature to provide for 
filling vacancies in office meant to limit the presumptive local control over local officer selection, the 
court concluded that the state constitution permitted counties to opt out of the standard vacancy-filling 
procedure provided by the legislature. 
Similarly, in In re Sanchez,141 the Supreme Court of Texas held that a local election procedure, 
which gave candidates for mayor and city commissioner more time to file to run for office than the 
state’s Election Code allowed, was not preempted. The court found that the local filing deadline was 
well within home rule’s provision for local self-government, but also did not doubt the legitimacy of 
state regulation of the procedures for local elections. Assuming the state could preempt an inconsistent 
local rule dealing with local election procedure, the court ruled the state “must do so with 
‘unmistakable clarity.’”142 The court concluded, through a rather impressive double incorporation by 
reference, that a phrase in the state statutory filing deadline that permitted another filing “as otherwise 
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provided by [the state Election Code]” picked up another provision of the Code enabling home rule 
cities to prescribe application requirements in municipal elections; as a result, state law did not 
preempt the local ordinance with the requisite unmistakable clarity.143 Moreover, the court 
subsequently specifically rejected the argument of the Texas Secretary of State in an amicus brief filed 
in support of rehearing, that “allowing home rule cities to set any filing deadline they want” would 
have an adverse effect on the state.144  
In Caulfield v. Noble,145 the Connecticut Supreme Court similarly focused on the absence of an 
explicit statement of preemptive intent from the Connecticut legislature.  In Caulfield, the town of 
New Canaan, pursuant to its charter, decided to put a year-end surplus into a special account, rather 
than use it to reduce the next year’s tax rate, as apparently required by state law. The court noted the 
tension between local home rule and lack of local control over taxation. On the one hand, home rule 
requires “that issues of local concern are most logically answered locally” so that to prevail over a 
conflicting home rule charter provision a state law “must pertain to those things of general concern to 
the people of the state, and it cannot deprive cities of the right to legislate on purely local affairs 
germane to city purposes.”146 On the other hand, home rule notwithstanding, under Connecticut law “a 
municipality has no inherent powers of taxation except those expressly granted by the legislature” 
which “can be lawfully exercised only in strict conformity to the terms by which they are given.”147 
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The court resolved that tension by noting, first, that however limited the powers of municipalities 
concerning taxation generally, “the imposition of real property taxes, a matter concerning the ordinary 
town corporate budget, incidental to the existence of the organized municipal corporation, is a local 
matter.”148 With that background, the court then considered the arguably preemptive state legislation 
and found “there is no indication that the legislature intended the statute to prevail in the face of the 
specific provisions of the local charter.”149 
Finally, the New Mexico Supreme Court expressed support for this preemption clear statement 
doctrine in the Haynes decision previously discussed.  In a portion of its opinion it labeled 
unnecessary to the case at hand but “helpful in resolving future cases,”150 the court underscored the 
need for a clear legislative statement of intent to preempt. The legislature’s flat provision for five city 
commissioners did not indicate a clear intent to fix the number of commissioners or prevent home rule 
municipalities from adopting a different number. There was no “limitation that the number of 
commissioners be set at only a stated number.”151 As with the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s 
decision in York, a state law concerning local structure was to be treated as a model, not a mandate.152 
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IV. Implications for Home Rule 
The significance of this modest jurisprudence of state political innovation should not be 
overstated. The case sample is small, and the selection of states limited. Some of the harder local 
innovations – like New York City’s extension of its contribution limits and disclosure requirements to 
all candidates, not just those opting into the voluntary public funding system – have not been tested. 
Nevertheless, the cases do have two significant implications for the future of home rule. 
First, as a matter of legal analysis, the cases suggest several arguments or legal techniques that 
may successfully advance the positions of localities in state-local conflicts. The significance of 
balancing – and of the fact that localities have prevailed in a fair number of balancing cases – may be 
surprising. The canned history of home rule has been that localities have done poorly when courts 
engage in state-local balancing. The usual assumption is that such balancing generally leads to the 
balancing away of local rights and powers in favor of vague and open-ended, but preemptive, state 
concerns. The rise of the legislative home rule model – which trades away all immunity in order to 
assure greater scope to local initiative – is surely at least in part attributable to the sense that local 
governments usually lose when balancing is the rule.  Yet, local governments sometimes prevail when  
courts are willing to balance competing state and local concerns. The key to local success in the 
balancing cases appears to be the combination of the intense local interest in the structures and 
procedures of local governance, with the absence of external effects or state-wide costs from local 
variations.  
This was perhaps suggested by Justice Hans Linde’s often-cited opinion in City of La Grande 
v. Public Employees Retirement Board distinguishing between state laws addressed to “substantive 
social, economic, or other regulatory objectives of the state” and those “addressed to . . . the structures 
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and procedures of local agencies.”153 In the former case, there would be no balancing and state law 
would automatically prevail. But because the latter type of state law burdens the “central object” of 
home rule – allowing the people of the locality “to decide upon the organization of their government 
and the scope of its powers” -- the state’s law would have to be balanced and justified against the local 
law.  To Justice Linde’s focus on the close connection between local measures dealing with local self-
government and home rule, the more recent cases add an almost economic concern with externalities 
and the lack thereof.  The judicial recognition that people outside Los Angeles don’t care whether 
Angelenos spend their tax dollars on paying for candidates’ campaigns or that New Mexicans outside 
Clovis have no interest in the size of the Clovis governing board – tied to the importance of these 
matters to the localities that have acted on these measures – were critical to the vindication of home 
rule in those cases. 
The “models, not mandates” and the clear statement cases also make an important analytical 
point – that state and local interests may be reconciled by treating general state laws dealing with local 
government structure, procedure, and elections as templates, or off-the-shelf models, for local 
governments which may be superseded by local governments that prefer to do things their own way.154 
There is nothing inherently wrong about state governments legislating about local matters. Such 
legislation may be useful to local governments, and assure a basic level of local government efficacy 
and integrity. But the purpose and ultimate effect of such measures should be to assure that some rules 
and procedures are in place to deal with basic governance questions, not to preclude local variation by 
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those localities that want alternatives– at least not until the state has clearly ruled out local variation 
(and, ideally, the state’s concerns are sufficiently weighty and narrowly tailored to the specific state  
interest to justify preempting a local alternative). 
Second, these cases suggest that the core focus of home rule on local government structure can 
be pushed out to reach closely related areas of critical significance to local autonomy. These areas 
could include, for example, the municipal employment relationship and municipal taxation. 
The municipal employment relationship goes to the heart of a local government’s ability to 
choose the services and service levels it will provide, and to its ability to pay for them. State 
requirements in this area often function as unfunded mandates, impairing governing capacity. A 
number of courts have extended the core local concern with the structure of local self-government to 
include local regulation of the municipal employment relationship. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court recently held that Philadelphia’s extension of health and other employment benefits to the same-
sex “Life Partners” of the city’s employees fell within the city’s “explicit authority to legislate 
regarding matters of local concern.”155  In words similar to the analysis engaged in by other courts 
considering local political innovation, the Pennsylvania court explained that “matters affecting merely 
the personnel and administration of offices local to Philadelphia” are of “no concern to citizens 
elsewhere” and, thus, a matter that Philadelphia could decide for itself.156 The Washington Supreme 
Court similarly upheld the authority of a city to extend health insurance benefits to the domestic 
                                                 
155 Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862 A.2d 1234, 1246–1247 (Pa. 2004)  
 




partners of city employees on the theory that municipal employee benefits are a matter of local 
concern directly connected to the underlying goals of home rule autonomy.157 Courts in Illinois,158 
Colorado,159 and California have placed aspects of the city and county employer-employee 
relationship within the core of home rule. Indeed, in 2003 the California Supreme Court invalidated, 
on home rule grounds, a state law requiring binding arbitration of economic issues between counties 
and unions representing firefighters and law enforcement officers.160 The court said that counties are 
free to choose binding arbitration, but that due to the centrality of the public employment relationship 
to home rule, binding arbitration cannot be imposed on them. 
To be sure, most states have broad authority to regulate the municipal employment 
relationship. Moreover, unlike the structures of local self-governance or the rules for local elections, 
municipal employment rules can have external effects since many municipal employees are 
nonresidents. But much as the organization of local government is a critical matter for local people, 
the municipal employment relationship is crucial for local governance, and the predominant concern 
with the municipal employment relationship is local. Whether through balancing or through subjecting 
state laws to clear statement rules, localities should consider trying to extend local control over local 
government to include local control over local personnel. 
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Local taxation, particularly taxation focused on real property within the locality, is another area 
where the combination of close connection to effective local self-government and limited external 
effects might support efforts to extend the zone of local autonomy. To be sure, taxation is generally 
heavily state regulated and nearly all states sharply limit local fiscal powers or deny that home rule 
includes the power to tax. But some local control over local taxation is necessary to make local self-
government effective. If local people decide that they would rather pay higher taxes in order to fund 
new programs or to avoid cutting existing programs, the costs of this decision are borne largely 
internally, and the decision should be up to local residents. Given the widespread political hostility to 
taxation, it is unlikely that such decisions will be undertaken lightly. Moreover, local government 
taxing decisions are constrained not just by their voters but by an often intense interlocal economic 
competition for businesses, jobs and taxpayers. The ability of mobile residents and firms to flee a 
high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax neighbor, along with local electoral control, provides a significant 
check on local taxing decisions. But the key point is that local taxation, like the rules and procedures 
of local government organization is primarily a local matter as well as critical to effective local self-
governance.161 
 
V. Implications for Political Reform 
Many years ago, Justice Brandeis famously offered a defense of federalism in terms of the 
possibility that state autonomy provides for innovation. As he observed, “a single courageous state 
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may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”162 Well, if the fifty states are laboratories for public policy 
formation, then surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide logarithmically more 
opportunities for innovation, experimentation and reform. Thousands of local governments provide 
thousands of arenas for innovation and for testing the costs and benefits of those innovations. 
San Francisco’s implementation of IRV garnered nationwide attention and sparked new 
thinking about alternative voting systems as a means of enabling the articulation of a wider range of 
political views. The many cities experimenting with different types of campaign reform sustain 
political movements that are frustrated by special interests and legislative gridlock at the state and 
national levels. The results of reformed local elections will also provide valuable lessons for state and 
national reformers when the time is ripe for state or national action. We know far more about the 
workability, benefits, and costs of IRV and public funding of election campaigns as a result of the 
innovative actions of cities like San Francisco, Tucson, Los Angeles, and New York. Although the 
case for home rule is typically made in terms of the benefits for city residents in obtaining greater 
opportunities for democratic participation, in tailoring local policies to local preferences, or even in 
obtaining the benefits of interlocal competition, the local political reforms demonstrate that the 
benefits of home rule are far from purely local.  
Indeed, these cases indicate that both the cost and the benefit side of the equation support local 
autonomy in political innovation. The costs of these initiatives are entirely local. As a result, there is 
no external interest in preventing local experimentation with new electoral systems or governmental 
procedures. But the benefits will be external – by providing new information about the consequences 
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of particular innovations – as well as internal.  There is, thus, a broad systemic interest in encouraging 
local political experimentation and in interpreting home rule to make such local innovation possible 
and to protect it from claims of state preemption. 
